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I. INTRODUCTION
The prospective review and approval of drugs is central to the public health
mission of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Requiring
pharmaceutical manufacturers to generate information about their products’ safety
and efficacy enables the agency to evaluate the risks and benefits associated with
their use, thereby preventing overly harmful products from reaching the market. The
majority of consumers benefit from this intervention by gaining access to an array of
drugs that are proven to be safe and effective. Thus, governmental regulation in this
area is arguably justified because the aggregate social welfare is substantially
improved.
However, this majoritarian view overlooks the concentrated costs that the drug
approval process imposes upon minority groups within society. Drug testing is both
resource intensive and time consuming, with an average of eight years required for
human clinical testing alone.1 For individuals suffering from terminal illness who

*
J.D.-expected, Spring 2008, Georgetown University Law Center; M.S., 2005, Health
Policy, Bloomberg School of Public Health, John Hopkins University; B. A., 2000, Balliol
College, Oxford University.
1
Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, New Drug Development: Estimating Entry
from Human Clinical Trials 9 (Federal Trade Comm’n Bureau of Economics, Working Paper
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have exhausted conventional therapies, this delay in access can be fatal. Many
terminally ill patients are therefore willing to tolerate vastly greater therapeutic risks
in an effort to find a cure. Under the current regulatory structure, however,
willingness to tolerate risk does not necessarily translate into access to unapproved
drugs.
The tension between drug safety and access to developing experimental drugs
most recently came to the forefront in 2003, when the Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs [hereinafter Abigail Alliance]2 brought suit to enjoin
the FDA from enforcing its current policy banning the use of post-Phase I
investigational drugs by terminally ill patients excluded from Phase II clinical trials.3
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized a constitutional substantive
due process right “to access potentially life-sustaining medication where there are no
alternative government-approved treatment options.”4 After concluding that the right
asserted by Abigail Alliance merits due process protection, the court remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether the FDA’s current policy withstands
the application of the rigorous strict scrutiny review, essentially, to determine
whether the policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.5
This article analyzes whether the government has a compelling interest in
preventing mentally competent, terminally ill patients from accessing post-Phase I
drugs. Part II reviews the history of FDA drug regulation and summarizes current
law pertaining to the drug approval process. Part III considers whether, in light of
the constitutional right recognized by the D.C. Circuit, the government’s interest in
public health can validate restrictions on drug access for terminally ill patients.
More specifically, Part III examines whether such restrictions can be justified either
by the benefits they confer upon terminally ill patients themselves, or by the benefits
they confer upon society at large. Finally, Part IV concludes by finding that both of
these justifications fail, thereby undermining the government’s claim to a compelling
interest in restricted drug access for this population.
II. FDA DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
A. History
Federal regulation of drugs began with the Pure Food and Drug Act [hereinafter

No. 262, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ be/workpapers/wp262.pdf (last visited June
2, 2007).
2
Abigail Alliance is a non-profit organization that aims to help cancer patients and others
with life-threatening illnesses through education and advocacy. See Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs, The Abigail Alliance Mission, http://abigailalliance.org/mission.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
3

Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
4
5

Id.

Id. at 486. On November 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the
FDA’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974, *1
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006).
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PFDA].6 Enacted in 1906 in response to criticism of widespread food and drug
impurities,7 this legislation established liability for the manufacture of adulterated8 or
misbranded9 drugs by requiring manufacturers to monitor their products for strength,
quality, and purity,10 and to provide complete and accurate labeling of drug
contents.11 However, the PFDA failed to set forth standards or specific methods of
pre-market testing that would prevent adulteration, or to provide any mechanism for
centralized regulatory approval of new drugs.12
The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy13 spurred Congress to take a more
significant step toward a pre-market drug approval system. Towards that end,
Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [hereinafter FDCA], which
required safety testing and government approval of new drugs before commercial
marketing.14 Under the provisions of the FDCA, prospective manufacturers were
required to file applications for the sale of new drugs with the Secretary of
Agriculture, describing drug components and composition, methods of production
control, and proposed labeling language.15 The FDCA also required applicants to
provide investigational safety reports and samples of the drugs under consideration.16

6
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915 §§ 1-12, 34 Stat. 768, 768-772, repealed by 21
U.S.C § 329(a) (1938).
7

Peter Barton Hutt, Development of Federal Law Regulating Slack Fill and Deceptive
Packaging of Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1987).
Although many factors precipitated passage of the 1906 Act, publication of Upton Sinclair’s
The Jungle played a significant role in generating the public outcry (and political will) needed
to spur legislative action. Id. See also UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
8

Pure Food and Drug Act § 7.

9

Id. § 8.

10

Id. §§ 1-12.

11

Id.

12

The 1906 Act did authorize the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department of Agriculture to
conduct compliance examinations of drugs. Pure Food and Drug Act § 4. However, this
provision did not require pre-market approval and served merely as a tool for policing
products already in the marketplace. See id.
13

Sulfanilamide, a drug used to treat streptococcal infections, had been shown to have
dramatic curative effects and had been used safely in tablet and powder form. In 1937,
however the S.E. Massengill Co. began to produce a liquid form (Elixir Sulfanilamide) by
dissolving the drug in diethylene glycol. The company laboratory tested the mixture for flavor,
appearance, and fragrance and found it satisfactory. The company then sent shipments of the
toxic mixture throughout the United States, ultimately causing the deaths of more than a
hundred people. See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981, available at http://www.fda.
gov/oc/history/elixir.html.
14

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2000).

15

21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000).

16

Id.
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Unless the Secretary of Agriculture rejected or postponed consideration of the
application within sixty days of filing, default approval was conferred by statute.17
The final step in the evolution of modern drug regulation occurred in response to
the thalidomide tragedy,18 after which Congress enacted the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments [hereinafter 1962 Amendments].19 The 1962 Amendments required
more rigorous pre-approval drug testing than was required under the original FDCA,
instituting a series of clinical testing “phases” that comprise the norm under current
law.20 At present, the initial steps in obtaining FDA approval entail laboratory and
animal testing to determine whether a drug is sufficiently safe and promising to
justify human experimentation.21 Using evidence gathered in these preliminary tests
to support safety and efficacy claims, the drug sponsor files an Investigational New
Drug (IND) application, seeking FDA authorization to begin the process of testing
on humans.22
B. The Clinical Trial System
Although clinical trials are both expensive and time consuming, the process of
submitting an IND for clinical testing approval is relatively straightforward. An IND
application notifies the FDA that a company is about to initiate clinical trials and
permits the FDA to conduct an initial assessment of the value of those trials on the
basis of the information provided by the applicant.23 If the IND application is
granted, the sponsor is permitted to begin clinical experimentation on human
subjects,24 which is mandatory for final FDA approval of a drug.25

17

21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938).

18

HARVEY TEFF & COLIN R. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 1-10 (1976).
Thalidomide, marketed as a sedative safe for use by pregnant women during the late 1950s
and early 1960s, resulted in birth defects in thousands of infants in Europe. Id.
19

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Drugs and Foods Under the 1938 Act and
Its Amendments, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/section3.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2007).
20

21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2000).

21

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), From Test Tube to Patient: Protecting
America’s Health Through Human Drugs, A Special Report From the FDA Consumer
Magazine and the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/default.htm.
22
David A. Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 281,
281-82 (1989).
23

Id. The IND application must include the names of parties responsible for the
investigation, a statement of the investigational plan, a statement of the name of the drug to be
tested and all its active ingredients, a summary of any previous human experience with the
drug, a description of the overall plan for investigation, identification of phases of clinical
investigation, a list of possible risks and side effects, a protocol for each planned study, and a
summary of pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug on animals. 21 C.F.R. §
312.23 (2000).
24

See id. § 314.126 (listing the FDA requirements regarding clinical trial methodology).

25

21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
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A three-phase process of testing on human subjects remains the FDA standard.26
Phase I consists of initial safety testing, during which a relatively small sample of
healthy, asymptomatic subjects receive the drug and are monitored for signs that the
drug may be unsafe for humans.27 If the results of Phase I indicate that the drug may
be safe, the sponsor proceeds to Phase II, during which both the safety and efficacy
of the drug are examined through controlled experimentation upon a larger sample of
symptomatic subjects.28 If the results from Phase II are promising, a much larger
sample is used in Phase III to further assess safety and efficacy.29
If the results of clinical testing are promising through Phase III, the IND sponsor
may decide to continue seeking FDA approval by submitting a New Drug
Application (NDA), which provides the FDA with information that includes the data
collected and analyzed during experimentation.30 Within 180 days, the FDA must
approve the application or notify the applicant of the opportunity to request a hearing
on the merits of the application.31 If granted, FDA approval is promised upon proof
of the safety and efficacy of the drug when used for the “on-label” purposes
stipulated by the drug’s sponsor.32
C. Expanded Access Programs
In an effort to balance the government’s interest in drug safety and efficacy with
terminally ill patients’ interest in gaining rapid access to promising therapies, the
FDA has carved out several exceptions to the clinical trial testing process described
above.33 These exceptions fall into one of two categories: expanded access (whereby
some patients gain access to drugs before approval) and expedited review (in which

26

21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2000).

27

Id. § 312.21(a). For cancer drugs, which are highly toxic, Phase I studies are normally
restricted to persons with cancer who have failed all other available therapies.
28

Id. § 312.22(b).

29

Id. § 312.22(c). In addition, a fourth and final phase may follow drug approval. Phase IV
consists of post-approval monitoring of drugs after they have been placed on the market.
Phase IV testing can be required by the FDA to measure the safety and efficacy of approved
drugs on an ongoing basis and to reevaluate drugs in light of developing scientific and medical
knowledge. Id. § 312.85.
30

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000). The NDA contains data demonstrating “whether
or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use.” Id.
31

21 U.S.C § 355(c)(1)(A) & (B) (2000).

32

Id. § 355(d). The 1962 Amendments require “substantial evidence . . . consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have. . . .” Id.
33
See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Expanded Access and Expedited
Approval of New Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS, http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/
expanded.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). The majority of these exceptions arose in response
to activism and political pressure during the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and several are
limited specifically to therapies for HIV/AIDS. Id.
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the approval process itself is hastened or truncated).34 Because drugs in the latter
category receive FDA approval before market entry, only the expanded access
exceptions are relevant to the analysis of a pre-approval right to access; thus, the
exceptions in this category are outlined below.
1. Treatment IND
In 1987, the FDA enacted “Treatment IND” provisions that formalized expanded
access procedures for patients suffering from serious or life-threatening diseases in
the absence of satisfactory approved alternative drugs or therapies.35 Under these
provisions, a drug manufacturer may apply to the FDA for permission to distribute a
promising investigational therapy prior to final approval if:
(i) The drug is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening
disease; (ii) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other
therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient
population; (iii) the drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical
trial, under an IND in effect for the trial, or all clinical trials have been
completed; and (iv) the sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively
pursuing marketing approval of the investigational drug with due
diligence.36
Treatment INDs are a viable option for serious diseases during or after Phase III
investigation and in some situations may be granted as early as Phase II.37 For
immediately life-threatening diseases, Treatment INDs are available “[e]arlier than
Phase III, but ordinarily not earlier than Phase II.”38 Although no statutory
requirements exist for data collection and reporting under Treatment INDs, the FDA
routinely requires administration of the experimental drug to be monitored for
safety.39
2. Group C Treatment IND
The FDA and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) established the Group C
Treatment IND, in which the drugs are distributed only by the National Institutes of

34

Id.

35

Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, 52 Fed.
Reg. 8,850 (proposed Mar. 19, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.34); 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466
(proposed May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 312.34). Immediately life-threatening
diseases are those for “[w]hich there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a
matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment.” 21 C.F.R. §
312.34(b)(3)(ii) (2000).
36

21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1) (2000).

37

Id. § 312.34(a). As an additional mode of access the FDA reserves the authority to
approve applications for compassionate use INDs on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 312.36.
38

Id. § 312.34(a). However, in practice the Treatment IND usually functions as a bridge
between the completion of controlled studies and final marketing approval. Id.
39

Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Drug Addiction, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 3, 2006, at 9.
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Health (NIH) under NCI protocols.40 Group C Treatment IND allows for oncologists
to obtain investigational agents for treating cancer outside the controlled clinical
trials.41 The drugs in this category are usually Phase III study drugs which show
“evidence of relative and reproducible efficacy in a specific tumor type.”42 Properly
trained physicians can administer these drugs without specialized supportive care
facilities.43 While patients treated under these guidelines are not participants in a
clinical trial, data on safety and effectiveness are still collected.44 Unlike Treatment
IND, which is available for experimental drugs intended to treat any serious or lifethreatening disease for which approved therapies are unavailable, the Group C
Treatment IND is a means for the compassionate distribution of investigational
agents for the treatment of cancer outside the controlled clinical trial setting.
3. Emergency Use IND
Both Treatment IND and Group C Treatment IND contain procedural
requirements that must be met before experimental drugs are made available.
However, the need for an investigational drug may arise in an emergency situation
that does not allow time for procedural compliance. If an emergency situation does
arise, the FDA can authorize the shipment of these drugs for a particular use.45 But,
the authorization is conditional on whether the sponsor files an appropriate
application as soon as possible.46
4. Parallel Track
In 1992, the Public Health Service (PHS) issued a Policy Statement providing for
expanded availability of INDs for the treatment of AIDS and other HIV-related
diseases through a “parallel track” mechanism.47 Parallel track studies run
concurrently with traditional studies, but can be conducted without the use of
experimental controls.48 The vehicle of sub-experimental quality trials expands
access to experimental drugs to those who cannot be included in the limited number
of slots available in the concurrent clinical investigation.
Collectively, these expanded access programs constitute an effort by the FDA to
respond to the interests of terminally ill patients. Nonetheless, many – including the
patients Abigail Alliance represents – contend that these reforms are insufficient. To
40

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Guidance for Institutional Review Boards
and Clinical Investigators: 1998 Update, http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/drugsbiologics.html
#treatment (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (2000).

46

See FDA, Guidance for Institutional Review Boards, supra note 40.

47

57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr. 15, 1992). While the logic of a parallel track could be applied
to other diseases, the PHS Policy is limited to AIDS and other HIV-related diseases.
48

57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13, PALTROW , COHEN & CAREY,256 (Apr. 15, 1992).
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determine whether further relaxation of the drug approval process is constitutionally
mandated, it is necessary to examine and evaluate the competing individual and
government interests at stake.
III. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITH STATE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
It is widely accepted that the government has a strong interest in protecting the
public’s health, one that the FDA may legitimately manifest through the drug
approval process described above.49 Pre-market drug approval arguably serves this
interest in two ways. By requiring a demonstration of safety, it prevents individuals
from harming themselves by consuming medicines that are essentially poisonous,
and it ensures that patients do not forgo effective therapies in favor of impotent
“snake oils.”50 Conversely, deviation from the drug approval process would
arguably threaten the government’s public health interest in two ways. Patients who
take drugs with only minimal safety information are at much greater risk of selfinduced injury. Additionally, it is hypothesized that a market for unapproved drugs
will diminish the supply of eligible clinical trial candidates, thereby harming the
ultimate beneficiaries of the clinical trial system.
However, for the government to restrict a fundamental constitutional right, it
must assert not only a legitimate interest, but one that is compelling.51 This highest
standard of review requires meaningful evidence that limitations on drug access for
the terminally ill are likely to realize the benefits described above. To determine
whether this standard is met, each of the justifications for government regulation
must be examined.
A. The Limits of Paternalistic Regulation
Traditionally, paternalistic governmental regulation – that is, regulation of
behavior that risks primarily the health or safety of the individual concerned – has
been controversial in the United States.52 Examples of paternalistic regulation in the
field of public health include mandatory motorcycle helmet and seatbelt use: from
the public health perspective, these laws are justified because they improve a
population’s health by reducing behavioral risks.53 Conversely, many argue that
individuals should have the right to make their own decisions about behaviors that

49

See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Development Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
50

The United States Supreme Court recognized this concern in United States v. Rutherford,
noting, “if an individual suffering from a potentially fatal disease rejects conventional therapy
in favor of a drug with no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences can be
irreversible.” United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979) (citation omitted).
51

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).

52

PROMOTING HEALTH: INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FROM SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 398 (Brian D. Smedley & S. Leonard Syme eds., 2000), available at
http://www.books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9939#toc (last visited June 2, 2007).
53

Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century: Part III: Public Health
Regulation: A Systematic Evaluation 283 JAMA 3118, 3119 (2000).
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primarily affect themselves.54 Under this logic, a person chooses not to wear a
seatbelt not because she is unaware of the risk, but presumably because that person
places one value (freedom from restraint) above another (physical security).
Legislatures and courts generally resolve this tension by balancing the benefits of
state action against the burdens imposed.55
Regulatory paternalism in the drug marketplace is generally justifiable under this
balancing approach, in part due to the informational asymmetries that exist between
transacting parties.56 In the example outlined above, the motorist has all the
information she needs to assess the risks and benefits associated with choosing not to
wear a seatbelt. By contrast, consumers could never fully possess the expertise
needed to evaluate the risks and benefits associated with pharmaceutical products
due to their highly technical nature. The FDA corrects this information gap by
requiring evidence of safety and efficacy as a condition of market entry, reducing the
likelihood that consumers will unwittingly ingest harmful products.57 Additionally,
the drug approval process serves a risk management function, spreading incremental
costs throughout society (in the form of restricted access) rather than allowing their
concentration on small groups of individuals (in the form of catastrophic harm).58
Hence any infringement of an individual liberty interest thus appears justified by
both collective and individual benefits.
While this logic holds true for the healthy majority, it is unclear whether it
applies to the minority of patients who are terminally ill and have exhausted all
available therapies. The needs and preferences of the terminally ill depart
systematically from those of the general public. By definition, such patients derive
no present benefit from FDA regulation because no approved therapy can
successfully treat their diseases. Furthermore, the potential for future benefit is only
marginal for persons who may not live long enough for that benefit to be realized.
For the terminally ill, restrictions on drug access, therefore, impose concentrated
costs with little to no benefit. It follows that the basic premise of paternalistic
regulation – that restrictions on liberty can be justified when in an individual’s best
interests – fails entirely in this context. Rather than promoting a compelling interest
in the health of terminally ill patients, FDA restrictions on drug access appear only to
deny this population a final chance for successful treatment.
Concededly, granting access to post-Phase I drugs does not guarantee that
patients’ lives will be extended. A recent meta-analysis of Phase I oncology trials
found that approximately only ten percent of patients responded positively to the
experimental therapy under investigation.59 Furthermore, many clinical trial
54

Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the “Old” Public
Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S138, S138-S159 (2003).
55

See Gostin, supra note 53, at 3118.

56

Michael D. Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and Rational Decision-Making: The
Balance of FDA New Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 663, 671-74 (2003).
57
The Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy serves as the paradigm case for this undesired outcome.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
58
59

Greenberg, supra note 56, at 674-75.

Elizabeth Horstmann et al., Risks and Benefits of Phase 1 Oncology Trials, 1991
Through 2002, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 895, 899 (2005).

318

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 20:309

participants experience improved outcomes not because of the study drug, but
because of the unusually high quality of ancillary care they receive in the research
setting.60 These ancillary benefits would not accrue to patients taking experimental
drugs in the usual care setting. However, the question presented is not whether
access to unapproved drugs will guarantee a health benefit to terminally ill patients.
Rather, given that the court has recognized a right of access, the question is whether
a compelling interest justifies government restrictions on that right. Concerns over
treatment efficacy or effectiveness do not provide the requisite justification.
Even if FDA regulation provides few affirmative benefits to terminally ill
patients, an important question remains: can the government maintain a compelling
interest in protecting these individuals from self-induced harm? The fact that
someone is terminally ill does not render his life worthless, nor does it eliminate his
interest in attaining the highest possible quality of life. Consumption of drugs whose
safety profile is only minimally understood could harm terminally ill patients by
further shortening their lives or by causing significant morbidity. These risks are
even more acute outside of the clinical trial setting, where close monitoring of
subjects serves to mitigate the potential for iatrogenic harm. Arguably, the
government’s interest in the safety of all patients (not only those with a chance of
long-term recovery) provides sufficient justification for restricting access to
unapproved drugs.
This line of reasoning, while not without merit, fails for several reasons. For one,
it establishes an indefensible double standard: terminally ill patients who qualify for
clinical trials can access potentially harmful drugs, but those who do not qualify
cannot. This differential treatment weakens the patient safety justification for
restricted access, as the government is clearly willing to tolerate risk to patients in a
controlled setting. While patients in the usual care setting may experience some
increased risk due to the absence of close monitoring, it is far from clear that this
increase is sufficient to justify restrictions on a constitutional right.
The patient safety argument is further undermined by the various expanded
access programs described above, which make unapproved drugs available to
patients in uncontrolled settings. Participants in those programs are exposed to the
same drug-related risks as are subjects in clinical trials, but without the benefits of
careful monitoring. The patient safety argument wrongly assumes that a denial of
access is the least restrictive means to achieve the government’s interest. To the
contrary, a qualified form of post-Phase I access – e.g., requiring careful safety
monitoring of patients taking the drug – would promote safety with less intrusion on
patient rights.61

60

Clinical trials often deviate substantially from usual practice conditions in ways that
benefit patients: providing free care, using specialized providers and settings, and maintaining
high treatment compliance. See Kenneth B. Wells, Treatment Research at the Crossroads:
The Scientific Interface of Clinical Trials and Effectiveness Research, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
5, 6 (1999).
61
This would mirror current FDA practice with Treatment INDs, which are granted on the
condition that the administration of the drug will be carefully monitored for safety. See
Emanuel, supra note 39, at 12.
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B. Safeguarding the Clinical Trial System
Government regulation of behavior with the potential to harm others has proved
less contentious than paternalistic regulation, as it fits more comfortably within the
liberal principles of the United States political framework.62 Many commentators
have criticized the Abigail Alliance decision on “harm to others” grounds, arguing
that the right recognized by the court poses a severe threat to the integrity of the drug
testing process.63 This argument posits that granting access to post-Phase I drugs
outside of the clinical trial context will reduce incentives to participate in those trials,
leaving researchers with insufficient numbers of subjects to generate statistically
valid data. Consequently, this occurrence will either delay the drug development
process or will pressure the FDA to approve drugs with incomplete knowledge about
their safety and efficacy. Recent history suggests that these concerns are not entirely
unfounded: the challenges associated with subject recruitment and retention are well
documented,64 while the highly publicized recall of COX-2 inhibitors such as Vioxx
and Celebrex indicates that the FDA approval process is already under considerable
strain.65
However, it is far from clear that these fears justify government action to restrict
the right to access post-Phase I experimental drugs. Critics of the court’s decision
hypothesize a causal nexus between the newly established right and the parade of
horribles described above, but neglect to address the myriad factors that mediate this
relationship. The scope of the constitutional right, the motives prompting subjects to
participate in clinical trials, and the willingness of pharmaceutical companies to
market unapproved drugs will all influence the impact of the court’s decision on the
drug testing process. Each of these factors must be scrutinized.
1. Scope of the Constitutional Right of Access
The degree of risk posed to the clinical trial system depends, first and foremost,
upon the definition of the right in question. Remarkably, the Abigail Alliance
opinion offers two different definitions, introducing a potentially troublesome
element of ambiguity into the analysis.66 In the first, which is the more expansive of
the two, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “carefully described” this right as
that “of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult patient to access potentially lifesaving post-Phase I investigational new drugs, upon a doctor's advice, even where
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that medication carries risks for the patient.”67 Yet in a later formulation, the court
adopted a more restrictive approach: “where there are no alternative governmentapproved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient's
informed access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs determined by
the FDA after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials
warrants protection under the Due Process Clause.”68
The distinction between a restricted and expansive formulation of the right is
central to determining the weight of the government’s interest in regulating access to
unapproved drugs. Under the restricted definition, a patient could gain access to
unapproved drugs only if there were “no alternative government-approved treatment
options.”69 Because an IND is a form of government approval, this restriction would
require patients to be declared ineligible for all relevant clinical trials as a
precondition to the exercise of the right. By contrast, the more expansive definition
would allow patients an unfettered choice between enrolling in a clinical trial and
purchasing the desired medication on the open market. This increased access could
discourage eligible candidates from participating in clinical trials, resulting in the
structural harms hypothesized above.
In fact, there are several indications that the court’s holding should be interpreted
to incorporate only the restricted definition. First, it conforms more precisely to the
scope of the right of which plaintiffs sought recognition.70 Furthermore, other
sections of the opinion suggest that the court did not contemplate recognizing a right
of access for patients eligible to participate in clinical trials.71 This evidence
substantially weakens the argument for a compelling government interest based on
potential harm to the clinical trial system, as it essentially leaves that system intact.
2. Research Subject Motivation
Assuming, arguendo, that an expansive reading of the right to access is correct,
an important question remains: will terminally ill patients abandon clinical trials to
obtain their medications on the private market? The answer depends in part upon the
motives that influence an individual’s decision to participate as a subject of research.
If clinical trial participants are motivated primarily by altruistic concerns, then
67
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increased access to unapproved drugs seems unlikely to alter current recruitment and
retention patterns. Conversely, if intrinsic motivations are paramount, then the
creation of a market for experimental drugs could substantially decrease the pool of
potential subjects.
Research data on this topic are limited, but at first glance it appears that the
binary distinction drawn above between intrinsic and extrinsic motives is rejected.
Subjects instead report a more nuanced decision-making calculus influenced by the
advice of physicians,72 family pressures,73 and the potential for financial benefit.74
However, when the data are stratified by the severity of the subject’s disease, the
binary picture reappears.75 While altruism may strongly motivate the decisions of
healthy research subjects,76 studies investigating participants in Phase I cancer trials
– the majority of whom are terminally ill – consistently identify therapeutic benefit
as the primary motive for participation.77
This finding validates the concern that creation of a market for unapproved drugs
will negatively impact the clinical trial process. If patients, upon the advice of their
physician, can simply purchase an experimental therapy, it is likely that many will do
so. Clinical trial enrollment involves both hassle (in the form of screening
procedures required to assess eligibility) and risk (in placebo-controlled trials, the
patient may not receive the active drug) that terminally ill patients may be unwilling
to contemplate. This factor, therefore, lends support to the government’s argument
that its interest in restricting access to unapproved drugs is a compelling one.
3. Will a Market Exist?
The weight of the FDA’s interest in preserving the current clinical trial system
depends upon the actions of the pharmaceutical industry. Assuming that a
constitutional right to access post-Phase I drugs does not give rise to a concomitant
obligation to provide them, pharmaceutical companies will have a choice whether to
make their products available to terminally ill consumers. If the companies choose
not to, then clinical trials will retain their near-monopoly over the distribution of
unapproved drugs. This would undercut the second prong of the FDA’s asserted
72
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interest, significantly weakening the agency’s justification for regulation.
There are several financial and logistical concerns that militate against
widespread industry participation in a post-Phase I market. Most significantly, there
often is a limited drug supply in the early stages of development. The batches
prepared for early drug studies are usually small because making larger amounts
available is expensive and not considered reasonable until there is evidence that the
drug is of therapeutic (and therefore financial) value.78 The new market created by
the Abigail Alliance decision is unlikely to change this cost-benefit analysis.
Because the constitutional right recognized by the court requires (1) terminal illness,
(2) mental competence, (3) a cooperating physician, and (4) no alternative means of
access, the pool of eligible patient-consumers is likely to be quite small.79 Thus, the
economies of scale needed to prompt manufacturers to produce larger quantities of
drugs simply may not exist.
One might argue that past participation in other expanded access programs
indicates that pharmaceutical companies will sell their products to patients seeking to
exercise the Abigail Alliance right. For example, eight years after Treatment INDs
were first made available, thirty-four manufacturer applications had been granted by
the FDA.80 However, Treatment INDs (as well as other expanded access
mechanisms) are normally granted for drugs already in Phase III testing, at which
point companies have made the decision to scale up their manufacturing processes.81
Thus, willingness to participate in expanded access programs can be seen as a
function of the very different cost-benefit analysis that occurs at this later stage of
testing, and does not necessarily predict similar behavior earlier in the drug approval
process.
There may also be competition for internal resources between expanded access
and the regulatory programs that lead to drug approval. For example, “[t]he process
of individualized packing and shipping of drugs for single patient use on an emergent
basis can be very disruptive to departments that are organized to pack and ship drugs
in a scheduled manner for clinical trials.”82 Because the market for an approved drug
often offers far greater financial incentives than the market for post-Phase I drugs,
companies may be unwilling to divert resources from the approval process to satisfy
the demands of this smaller market.
Finally, the use of an investigational drug in an uncontrolled setting in patients
78
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with very advanced disease, could lead to adverse reactions that might raise difficult
but spurious safety and efficacy concerns about the drug. This is evident by the fact
that “[t]he FDA expects very low response rates . . . [and numerous adverse events in
clinical trial participants] who have received multiple previous therapies.”83 Such
outcomes do not necessarily damage a drug’s chance for approval, because
sophisticated statistical analyses are used to segregate the drug’s effects from those
associated with the patient’s underlying illness.84 However, adverse events occurring
outside of the clinical trial context are not subject to the same rigorous monitoring
requirements and, thus, cannot be analyzed in this way. This introduces an element
of uncertainty into the drug development process, which could reduce a product’s
chances for approval.
These logistical barriers, together with limited financial incentives, suggest that
pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to participate in a market for post-Phase I
drugs. This conclusion further damages the FDA’s asserted interest in regulation,
which assumes that patients would abandon clinical trials should a market exist for
procuring unapproved medications. If no market were to exist, this assumption
would be unfounded.
IV. CONCLUSION
FDA regulation undoubtedly serves to promote compelling government interests
in consumer protection and public health. However, in questioning whether these
interests support restrictions on access to post-Phase I drugs by terminally ill
patients, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit suggested that the answer is no:
In this case, the government’s interest may prove to be weaker than that
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Rutherford because the Alliance seeks only access to investigational new
drugs that the FDA, after Phase I human trials, has deemed sufficiently
safe for human testing on a substantial number of human beings. In other
words, the Alliance seeks for its members the same right of access
enjoyed by those terminally ill patients lucky enough to secure a spot in
Phase II trials.85
Building upon the court’s logic, this article argues that restrictions on terminally
ill patients’ access to post-Phase I drugs do not further a compelling government
interest. Such restrictions provide no affirmative benefits for these patients, nor do
they offer meaningful protection from self-induced harm. While restricting access to
unapproved drugs does benefit the public at large, that benefit is not threatened by
the narrow exception required by the Abigail Alliance decision. Consequently, FDA
regulation of unapproved drugs must be modified to overcome this constitutional
infirmity.
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